In our era of global finance, the theory of aggregate demand management is alive and unwell, says Amit Bhaduri. In this policy brief, Bhaduri describes what he regards as a prevalent contemporary approach to demand management. Detached from its Keynesian roots, this "vulgar" version of demand management theory is being used to justify policies that stand in stark contrast to those prescribed by the original Keynesian model.
Rising asset prices and private-debt-fueled consumption play the starring roles, while fiscal policy retreats into the background.
Returning to foundations laid down by Keynes and Kalecki, Bhaduri sets out to clarify whether there is any place for traditional demand management policies-featuring an active role for deficit spending and public investment-in the context of financial globalization, and he concludes that such policies are ultimately unavoidable if we are to revitalize the real economy and achieve stability.
This policy brief emphasizes not only that globalization has elevated the relative importance of the external market, but also that we are living through a period in which trade in financial assets, enabled by multinational banks and other financial institutions, overwhelms, in terms of quantitative significance, trade in goods and services and foreign investment in physical assets. This era of financial globalization is marked by layers of private debt contracts that are generated at will by financial institutions-a system of private credit creation that is increasingly centered on a shadow banking system that exists largely beyond regulatory and supervisory control, and (at least formally) without the support of a lender of last resort.
While some might insist that the age of global finance leaves little room for the idea of demand management, Bhaduri contends that the theory survives, but that it does so in a form that is nearly unrecognizable from the original. This contemporary model of demand management receives its inspiration from the presuppositions of neoclassical economics, and its policy emphasis is often the very opposite of the old Keynesian model. In the context of the mobile and short-term nature of contemporary financial investment, the perceived need to maintain a healthy climate for finance and protect against the risk of capital flight disciplines and constrains fiscal policy, while elevating the status of price-stability-focused monetary policy. Instead of public investment aimed at full employment, policymakers pursue restrictions on government spending and a shifting of the tax burden away from corporate profits and toward wages and salaries. Bhaduri argues that such policies exacerbate inequality and thereby suppress aggregate demand. To support demand, the "vulgar," or "Great Moderation," model hinges on the interplay between expectations of ever-rising asset prices and a consumption boom driven by private debt.
Bhaduri cautions, however, that a model centered on private credit creation is prone to instability. More and more financial investment is needed to produce greater returns and boost asset prices, continually shifting the composition of investment from the real to the financial and creating the conditions for a delinking of finance from output and employment. When the paths of the financial and real sectors of the economy diverge, when incomes stagnate while debt and asset prices continue to rise, this creates the conditions for a financial crisis. At that point, the government is called upon to inject liquidity into the financial system. But this is not enough, says Bhaduri: it saves the financial sector, but not the real economy. Ultimately, he suggests that a revival of traditional Keynesian demand management, including large-scale, deficit-financed public investment, is needed to return the real economy to a state of health and stabilize the system as a whole.
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Even as societies change, powerful social theories can often survive, not as a coherent body of reasoning, but in a "vulgar" form. (2) In a recession, the generation of additional income in response to higher expenditure is mostly brought about through increases in production, as quantities respond more vigorously and with greater speed than prices, even in the short run, to higher demand caused by higher autonomous expenditure. This inverts both Marshallian and Walrasian presumptions that prices, rather than quantities, adjust in the short run. In "normal" times, the trust in large, private financial institutions is high and the debt contracts circulate as privately guaranteed "credit money." However, somewhat like in an explosive chemical reaction, they not only act as catalysts, speeding up the reaction, but also produce even more catalysts, thereby accelerating the process. In a closed, self-referential system that includes private credit-rating agencies, massive amounts of private debt contracts become available on demand as credit money, fueling demand for financial assets-assets that are merely other forms of private debt contracts repackaged for financial investment.
This system works well and is predisposed toward asset-price inflation to keep expectations of capital gains alive.
The asset portfolio of a country undergoes changes in composition due to expectations of changes in the exchange rate and monetary (e.g., the interest rate) and fiscal (e.g., the corporate tax rate) policies of the national governments, affecting expectations of capital gains and losses on asset prices. Since assets are denominated in different currencies and held by nationals of different countries, portfolio changes entail cross-border and crosscurrency transactions, with the result that expectations of capital gains and losses significantly impact the composition of existing portfolios of assets. This is a two-way process: while national economic policies affect expectations of capital gains and losses, these expectations in turn affect national exchange rate policies through the channel of international capital flows.
The fear of capital outflow that may be induced by government fiscal policy puts a serious constraint on traditional demand management policies. Unless the sentiments of the financial market are respected sufficiently to keep "high finance"
happy, capital flight becomes a threat to a stable economic environment. Kalecki (1943) had foreseen this possibility while discussing the political viability of full employment policies over time and their impact on the "investment climate" of a country.
He argued that the compulsion to maintain the authority structure in a capitalist democracy requires capitalists to retain the initiative of managing the economy by disciplining workers and having a commanding position in relation to the state.
Continuous high employment attained through budget deficits and public spending allows the initiative of policymaking to pass from the captains of industry to the hands of the government.
Full employment also weakens the threat of job loss to workers. These private credit contracts are created endogenously by the profit-seeking private financial sector to exploit as well as create new demand for financial assets. This expansion of private credit without restraint fuels further asset price increases. It offers the lure of exceptional returns, especially from esoteric assets, while a self-referential private credit-rating system (a creature of the financial system) gains importance in underplaying risks in order to keep the show going. Private credit-rating agencies become the guardians legitimizing the system, rating not only private credit but also sovereign risk, where the latter is meant to rate government fiscal policy in terms of its impact on financial markets.
As this process continues, the financial system increasingly tends to delink itself from the performance of the real economy in terms of employment and output. The turning point may come in a manner similar to that of a Ponzi scheme, but on a macroeconomic scale. It is reached when even higher returns have to be promised on financial investment to keep asset prices rising, which also continuously diverts the composition of total investment from real to financial investment. However, financial investment encouraging further financial investment for the acquisition of claims (and derived counter-claims) on existing assets does not help the real economy to raise demand for goods and services, but rather raises the price of assets. In a more extreme case, the real economy may stagnate or even decline, while the prices of financial assets and the stock market continue to rise. This is the prelude to a financial crisis, as the divergence grows between the real and the financial sector of the economy.
The probability of default in the real sector increases when stagnant incomes combine with rising debt and high asset prices. but liquidity is in short supply, since everyone had expanded credit contracts through private guarantees. A financial catastrophe due to a sudden freeze of credit looms large.
The irony of the situation is that such a collapse of the private financial system can be avoided only through an injection of 
